Instability and the Incentives for Corruption by Campante, Filipe Robin et al.
 
Instability and the Incentives for Corruption
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Campante, Filipe R., Davin Chor, and Quoc-Anh Do. 2009.
Instability and the Incentives for Corruption. Economics and
Politics 21(1): 42-92.
Published Version http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
0343.2008.00335.x/abstract
Accessed February 19, 2015 8:19:18 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4778510
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAInstability and the Incentives for Corruption
Filipe R. Campantey Davin Chorz Quoc-Anh Dox
This version: January 2008
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between corruption and political stability, from both theoretical
and empirical perspectives. We propose a model of incumbent behavior that features the interplay
of two eects: A horizon eect, whereby greater instability leads the incumbent to embezzle more
during his short window of opportunity; and a demand eect, by which the private sector is more
willing to bribe stable incumbents. The horizon eect dominates at low levels of stability, since rms
are unwilling to pay high bribes and unstable incumbents have strong incentives to embezzle, whereas
the demand eect gains salience in more stable regimes. Together, these two eects generate a non-
monotonic, U-shaped relationship between total corruption and stability. On the empirical side, we
nd a robust U-shaped pattern between country indices of corruption perception and various measures
of incumbent stability, including historically-observed average tenures of chief executives and governing
parties: Regimes that are very stable or very unstable display higher levels of corruption when compared
to those in an intermediate range of stability. These results suggest that minimizing corruption may
require an electoral system that features some reelection incentives, but with an eventual term limit.
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This paper investigates how political stability aects the incentives of incumbents to engage in corrupt
behavior. At a basic level, access to public oce provides opportunities for extracting corruption rents,
and the possibility of losing oce naturally constrains an incumbent's window of opportunity for doing
so. In addition, many lucrative projects that generate these rents, such as the exploitation of a natural
resource or construction contracts, often take time to deliver their full monetary returns, and can thus
be halted if the incumbent is removed or if the opposition has sucient clout to block the project. One
would thus expect that an incumbent's security of tenure and his ability to marshal support for his favored
projects, both crucial components of political stability, should be key in determining his willingness and
ability to extract these rents.1 We tackle this relationship between incumbent stability and corruption
from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.
As a conceptual starting point, it is important to recognize that the term \corruption" encompasses a
wide range of related, but nevertheless distinct, ways in which public ocials may improperly derive private
gain, such as embezzling or misappropriating public funds, accepting kickbacks for favors or licenses, or
engaging in nepotism.2 A key insight of this paper is that political stability can have contrasting eects
on dierent forms of corrupt activity.
On the one hand, a lower level of stability shortens the incumbent's eective decision-making horizon,
which can lead to more corrupt behavior along the lines of Olson's (1991) \roving bandit". An incumbent
who is very unstable would nd it optimal to steal more today instead of letting the pool of resources
accumulate into the future, given the uncertainty over whether he will still be in power tomorrow. We can
thus expect corruption in the form of direct embezzlement { the diversion of public resources straight into
one's pocket { to decrease as the incumbent's position becomes more stable. This horizon eect can be
thought of as a \supply"-driven eect, as it has to do with the willingness of the public ocial to supply
or divert resources towards corruption.3
On the other hand, other forms of corruption entail a long-term relationship between the incumbent
and a third party, for example when a bribe is paid by a private rm for a resource concession that will take
several years to exploit. In this situation, the private sector's willingness to pay bribes actually increases
with political stability, as businesses will be more inclined to wheel-and-deal with an incumbent whose
1Note that we do not limit our concept of stability to the violent or unconstitutional removal of the incumbent, as is often
the narrower use of the term \political instability".
2Nye (1967), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Svensson (2005), and Glaeser and Goldin (2006) among others have drawn similar
distinctions on the dierent manifestations of corruption. Olken (2007) uncovers an interesting example of how incumbents
appear to substitute between dierent forms of corruption. In a eld experiment involving road-building projects in Indonesia,
the use of an external audit led to a decrease in direct stealing of project funds, but resulted instead in an increase in nepotism
in hiring decisions related to the projects.
3This horizon eect will be mitigated if there is a possibility that the incumbent can return to power some time after
being ousted. Such a political return will presumably be likelier when there is more turnover and instability in the political
environment. We have explored this possibility in an extension using an innite-horizon Bellman approach, in which we nd
that this \resurrection" eect dampens the horizon eect, but does not reverse it.
1position they assess to be more secure. Put otherwise, a stable regime is more conducive for an incumbent
and the private sector to develop the connections through which the ow of bribes will run. We dub this
eect the demand eect, since it is driven by the private sector's demand for corruption.4
This paper's rst point is to develop a model that formalizes the interplay between these two eects.
In our set-up, a self-interested incumbent makes an optimal allocation of public resources to two dierent
forms of corrupt activity, namely direct \embezzlement" and third-party \licensing". (These labels serve as
a shorthand for the multiple types of activities typically regarded as corruption, with the main distinction
being that \licensing" involves an interaction with the private sector.) However, the incumbent's position
is potentially unstable, in that there is some probability each period that he will be ousted or that his
policies will be blocked.
We show that the two aforementioned eects combine to generate a non-monotonic relationship between
total corruption and stability that approximates a U-shape. At low levels of stability, the horizon eect
unambiguously prevails, and total corruption falls as the incumbent's stability improves. On the other
hand, the demand eect dominates in more stable regimes, leading to a positive relationship between total
corruption and stability over higher ranges of the latter. The underlying logic is intuitive: The private
sector is reluctant to bribe an unstable incumbent, so direct stealing will be the main source of corruption
revenues in highly unstable regimes. In the face of a small increase in stability over this low range, the
private sector remains pensive about investing heavily in bribes, leaving the unstable incumbent with few
opportunities to substitute from embezzlement into licensing. This marginal increase in stability therefore
reduces total corruption because it lengthens the incumbent's expected horizon and directly decreases his
incentive to embezzle. However, over higher ranges of stability, bribery becomes more enticing, and this
opens the door for the demand eect, since the prospect of long-term deals raises the private sector's
demand for corruption. Corruption thus increases with stability in relatively stable regimes, as long as the
incumbent's ability to extract rents from the private sector is suciently high so as to make bribery an
important source of corruption revenues.
The picture that emerges from our model is consistent with a lot of anecdotal evidence. On one end of
the spectrum, countries such as Brazil (in the early 1990s) and Pakistan have grappled with a combination
of low stability and high corruption. For example, Easterly (2003) surmises that\political instability has
made Pakistan's successive governments more like Mancur Olson's (2000) `roving bandit', who loots only
for today" [p.464]. Conversely, autocratic regimes such as Mexico under the Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI), Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi, and Indonesia under Suharto were stable for long periods, but
saw extensive corruption as the ruling elite exercised a monopoly over rent-seeking activities. Last but not
least, competitive democracies fall conveniently in the category of intermediate stability and lower levels
4The idea of modeling corruption as the outcome of demand and supply forces within an unocial market is not new, with
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) being a seminal piece. One contribution of our paper is to analyze how political stability interacts
with these demand-supply eects to inuence the level of corruption.
2of corruption.5 We discuss in detail how our theory is relevant for understanding individual countries'
experiences with corruption with a pair of case studies, for Brazil and Mexico. These countries provide
sharp illustrations of the horizon and demand eects, with observers having written about how corruption
has ebbed and owed in these countries as political stability has uctuated.
The paper's second main point is empirical: We uncover a U-shaped pattern between the country-
level indices of corruption perception commonly used in empirical work, and various measures of political
stability.6 The strength of this pattern, which is documented extensively in Section 3, can be veried along
many dimensions. This U-shaped relationship shows up consistently in our main specication using the
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006, henceforth KKM) corruption perception measure, even after we
control for a battery of additional determinants of corruption deemed important in the literature. It is
also robust to the use of the Transparency International and International Country Risk Guide indices,
two additional measures that are also widely used in empirical work. We obtain these results using two
dierent measures of political stability: (i) the historically-observed average tenure of a country's chief
executive; and (ii) the average tenure of the party in power. (We also nd supportive results using a
more indirect measure of stability, the governing coalition's share of seats in the legislative.) Our ndings
hold both in a cross-section of countries (where we average the relevant variables over time), as well as
when estimation is performed on the yearly data using dynamic panel GMM techniques which help to
allay concerns over endogeneity arising from country-specic unobservables or reverse causality. Finally,
we nd support for a corollary concerning the relationship between corruption and the size of government.
Our model predicts that the latter variable is positively correlated to stability, and hence also stands in a
U-shaped pattern with corruption; we do indeed nd some evidence for such a pattern in the data.
Our analysis yields meaningful policy implications regarding what institutional settings might be op-
timal for keeping corruption at bay. The non-monotonic relationship between corruption and political
stability identied in our theory and supported in our empirical analysis suggests that a combination
of the possibility of reelection and the presence of term limits is necessary: The former counteracts the
incentives to embezzle posed by the horizon eect, whereas the latter keeps the demand eect in check.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper falls within an extensive literature on the causes of corruption.7 It builds on a well-established
body of empirical work which has identied various systematic determinants of corruption, including
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Mauro 1995), the presence of economic rents (Ades and Di Tella 1999),
5As further illustration, it has been suggested that the reason why the Baltic countries had a better track record on
corruption than other transition economies was that \because [their] governments are [relatively] weak and fast-changing,
they are also limited in their ability to advance their nancial backers' interests" (The Economist, 11 Dec 2004, p.48). This
is precisely the spirit behind the demand eect that we have outlined.
6Interestingly, in one of the rst cross-country studies on corruption, Mauro (1995) reported a positive correlation between
the Business International corruption index for 1980-1983 and a subjective index of political stability from the same source.
However, his paper did not explore the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship.
7For an overview of issues, see Bardhan (1997), Lambsdor (1999), and Svensson (2005).
3the level of democracy (Treisman 2000), and electoral rules (Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003). As we
will show, our empirical results are robust to the inclusion of these controls, which suggests that political
stability also belongs on this list as a key proximate determinant of the incentives for corruption. While
political stability has previously been linked to outcomes such as aggregate growth (Alesina and Perotti
1996, Alesina et al. 1996), this is one of the rst attempts (to the best of our knowledge) to model and
estimate a link to corruption.
Several earlier studies have alluded to a potential link between corruption and stability. Olson's (1991,
2000) and DeLong and Shleifer's (1992) discussions of the importance of decision-making horizons on the
behavior of incumbents, and to some extent the models of electoral accountability such as Barro (1973)
and Ferejohn (1986), include forces similar to our horizon eect.8 As for the demand eect, similar
considerations are implicit in Rose-Ackerman's (1999) discussion of the role of checks and balances on
the government in curbing corruption. Along similar lines, Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) analyze how
corruption and instability interact in inuencing policy in a lobbying model. While their paper contains
ideas that resemble the horizon and demand eects, it does not deal directly with the impact of stability
on corruption, taking instead the incumbent's propensity for corruption as an exogenous parameter. In
a dierent but related context, Acemoglu (2005) also obtains a U-shaped relationship between a ruler's
incentives to act in detriment of public welfare and the inherent strength of the state, arising from a
similar interplay between his incentives to invest in the economy and his ability to extract rents. While
his mechanism operates via investment in public goods, ours is based on the possibility of accumulating
resources into the future.
Most recently, and quite importantly, a growing body of work based on micro-level measures of cor-
ruption has emerged that strongly arms the empirical relevance of the key mechanisms underlying our
theory. Using evidence from Brazilian municipality audits, Ferraz and Finan (2007) compare mayors who
are in their rst term in oce to those who are in their second term, which by law has to be their last one.
They show that mayors in their mandatory last term tend to be more corrupt, a result which is entirely
consistent with the horizon eect. More direct support comes from Gamboa-Cavazos, Garza-Cant u and
Salinas (2006), who explicitly test an extension of our model. They obtain measures of local corruption re-
ported by private rms in Mexico, and regress them on measures of the stability of state governors, namely
the number of years left in oce and their legislative support. Their nding of a U-shaped relationship
between corruption and these stability variables is an important piece of evidence that complements the
cross-country results we obtain, and further strengthens the case for our framework.9 The paper proceeds
as follows. Section 2 presents the model and our key theoretical results. While we present the model in
8Shleifer and Vishny's (1993) prediction that weak decentralized governments would exhibit more corruption also hints at
a relationship with political stability. Their mechanism, however, is the lack of coordination among dierent public ocials,
whom private rms need to bribe to obtain licenses that are complementary to each other. Our model, by contrast, focuses
on public ocials who deal with corruption opportunities that are essentially unrelated.
9Le, Mehlkop and Grae (2004) nd mixed evidence when investigating the cross-country relationship between corruption
and stability, but their analysis uses measures of stability that focus more narrowly on political violence and unrest.
4a more general setting in which the incumbent can divert some resources towards bolstering his stability,
for pedagogical purposes, we rst build up the intuition from a baseline case in which the incumbent
treats his stability as an exogenous parameter. We also discuss here two country case studies that provide
further illustration for the horizon and demand eects that we propose. We then turn in Section 3 to the
cross-country evidence on the U-shaped relationship between corruption and political stability. Section 4
concludes.
2 Theory: How Instability Shapes the Incentives for Corruption
2.1 The Model
2.1.1 Basic Setup
We consider an innite-horizon economy with an initial pool of available resources, K0, the allocation of
which is controlled by an incumbent. There is some probability  that the incumbent and his policies
survive from one period to the next;  thus measures the incumbent's stability. For simplicity, this
incumbent derives personal utility only from diverting resources towards his corruption rents. At any
given point in time, t, resources can be diverted through either: (i)\Embezzlement", Et, which entails
direct stealing, or (ii) \Licensing", Lt, which involves granting private sector rms control over some of
the resources in exchange for an upfront bribe payment. In addition, the incumbent can choose to spend
some amount, Pt, out of the initial pool of resources to boost his own stability (and thereby increase his
probability of staying in power to enjoy future rents):  is an increasing function of Pt, (Pt).10
The distinctive characteristic of the forms of corruption we gather under the \licensing" label is that
they entail an interaction between the incumbent and private sector rms. Let (Lt;(Pt)) denote the ex
ante expected value of prots reaped by the private rm from the license Lt. The key assumption here
is that  is an increasing function of stability. (In deriving the equilibrium below, we will in fact impose
the simplifying assumption that the licenses become void when the incumbent is ousted, but we do not
need to go to this extreme.) This captures the idea that, to the extent that there is an intertemporal
dimension in the corrupt relationship, the presence of the incumbent in power is valuable to the rm with
whom he maintains that relationship: An unstable incumbent will be less likely to be able to deliver on
his side of the deal, and hence will be less valuable to his prospective private-sector partner. In particular,
we specify that (Lt;0) = 0, so that rms have no interest in bribing an unstable incumbent who has zero
probability of being in power in the next period.11 Finally, we assume that the incumbent has the ability
to extract a fraction  of expected prots as an upfront bribe payment for the license;  thus measures
the incumbent's bargaining power with respect to the private sector.
10In the event that the incumbent is ousted, we assume he receives a zero payo in all subsequent periods.
11This description of the \demand side" of the corrupt relationship can be reconciled with a model of \political cycles" in
which an incumbent might increase the number of licenses issued just before an election, when his stability is at its lowest.
In our setup, this increased supply would be met by a low level of demand given the unstable position of the incumbent, and
hence fetch a low \price" per license. Corruption rents from licensing can therefore decrease as such.
5Finally, in each period, the remaining untouched resources are transformed into the pool of resources
available in the next period, subject to diminishing returns: Kt+1 = A(Kt   Et   Lt   Pt). This has the
interpretation of being a growth equation with technological parameter A. In other words, what is not
embezzled, licensed, or spent in boosting stability, is left for the \rest of the economy" and accumulates
over time. This sequence of events is summarized in Figure 1:
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
The incumbent's problem is one of maximizing his expected income.12 The sequence problem for the
incumbent can be described by:
max
Et0; Lt0; Pt0
1 X
t=0
(Pt)t[Et + (Lt;(Pt))] where Kt+1 = A(Kt   Et   Lt   Pt) (1)
Our denition of corruption in each period,  t, is the amount of illicit income that the incumbent
receives, normalized by the resources available at the start of the period, namely:
 t =
Et + (Lt;(Pt))
Kt
(2)
The normalization ensures that the measure of corruption is not subject to scale eects, so that larger
countries are not deemed more corrupt simply because there are more resources available.
2.1.2 Stability
We now elaborate on our formulation of incumbent stability. The variable Pt captures the idea that the
stability of the incumbent can be aected by the resource allocation decisions he makes. Concretely, one
can think of Pt as an amalgam of expenditures that can improve his stability in dierent ways, including:
public goods spending that is valued by the masses, such as on education, healthcare or infrastructure;
expenditures that can be used to restrain public opposition, such as military or police spending; and
patronage strategically dispensed to cultivate political support from key voters or political players. While
we will refer to Pt as \public goods provision", the important thing for our purposes is that this expenditure
boosts the incumbent's stability but also diverts resources away from his own pocket. Following this
discussion, we specify stability to be a function of the incumbent's choice of Pt, denoted by g(Pt), where
g() is increasing and concave, with g(0) = 0. This function enables us to describe how eective public
goods provision is in bolstering the incumbent's position.
In practice, however, an incumbent's stability also depends on some factors that he cannot easily aect.
We incorporate this feature by assuming that overall stability also depends on the intrinsic stability of
the polity, denoted by  2 [0;1]. We interpret  as an exogenous, \systemic" level of stability capturing
12We implicitly assume that the incumbent can smooth his consumption over time, for example, by depositing the income
in an oshore account. We treat such funds as unrecoverable by the state should the incumbent be ousted. For simplicity,
there is no time discounting in addition to what is implicitly introduced by the stability parameter.
6underlying features such as the ethnic composition of the population or cultural norms, which are largely
beyond the incumbent's control. Note that these deep-seated features can in turn be mapped into a
desired level of public goods provision, P, dened by g(P) = . For instance, following Alesina, Baqir
and Easterly (1999), a more fractionalized polity with a lower  would in equilibrium have a lower desired
level of public goods provision, since each individual attaches a smaller value to public goods consumption
by other people who do not belong to his/her ethnic group.
In sum, we specify stability (with a slight abuse of notation) to be  = (;g(P)), where the latter
expression allows us to distinguish between the components of stability that are under the incumbent's
control, and those that are beyond it.
2.2 Benchmark Case: Exogenous Stability
It is useful to start by presenting a benchmark special case of the model in which stability is entirely
beyond the incumbent's control, namely where g(P) and hence  are constants. This special case conveys
the basic intuition in its sharpest form; we will then move on to show how the intuition generalizes, and
how new testable predictions can be obtained in the more general model.
2.2.1 Characterizing the Equilibrium
For ease of exposition, we focus on a simple case for the private sector's expected prot function: (Lt;) =
AFLt, where AF is the private sector technology parameter. This corresponds to a situation where the
license is valid for one period only, period t + 1, and production is undertaken with an AK technology,
subject to the possibility that the license will be voided in the event of a discontinuation of the incumbent's
policies.13 The problem in (1) can now be re-formulated as a Bellman equation with value-function V ():
V (K0) = max
E00; L00
fE0 + AFL0 + V (K1)g where K1 = A(K0   E0   L0) (3)
It is easy to show, from the rst-order conditions with respect to E0 and L0, that one of these quantities
must be zero, except in a knife-edge scenario. (This is a consequence of the linear functional forms in
this baseline model. In an appendix available upon request, we have also established our results with
an objective function which is jointly concave in both embezzlement and licensing revenues, and which
therefore allows both forms of corruption to coexist in equilibrium.) Which of these two cases will prevail
depends on the parameters of the model. If AF < 1, then the marginal gain from a small increment
in E0 exceeds that from a similar increment in L0. In this case, the incumbent does not allocate any
resources to licensing, and corruption takes only the form of embezzlement. Conversely, if AF > 1,
then the incumbent reaps private revenues through licensing only. The analysis is most interesting when
the cut-o value of  separating the two cases,   1
AF , lies in the interval [0;1], which happens when
13The basic results in the propositions below hold for a fairly general class of functional forms for (Lt;) satisfying L > 0,
 > 0 and L > 0.
7AF > 1. Intuitively, this condition means that the incumbent's ability to extract surplus and the private
technology parameter are high enough, so that licensing is attractive over part of the relevant [0;1] range
for . We now characterize the two cases:
Case 1: AF < 1, ie  < 1
AF .
In this case, Lt = 0 for all t  0. Using the FOCs, the Envelope Thorem, and (2) one can solve for the
level of embezzlement-related corruption:
 0 = 1  
(A)
1
1 
K0
 t = 1   ; 8 t  1
9
=
;
(4)
Observe that corruption depends on the initial endowment of resources, K0, only in the very rst period
(t = 0); from t = 1 onwards, the model is in a \steady state" in which corruption remains constant, given
the parameter values.14
Case 2: AF > 1, ie  > 1
AF .
Here, the marginal gain from a small increment in L0 exceeds that from a similar increase in E0. The
incumbent now does not allocate any resources to embezzlement, and corruption takes only the form of
licensing revenues. From the FOCs and (2), this yields the following expression for corruption:
 0 = AF

1  
(A)
1
1 
K0

 t = AF(1   ); 8 t  1
9
> =
> ;
(5)
2.2.2 Corruption and Stability
We now analyze the comparative statics for corruption with respect to stability, focusing on the steady
state (t  1).15 Consider rst Case 1. It is straightforward to see from (4) that  t is decreasing in , hence
corruption is decreasing in stability for  < . Here, the one force at play is the horizon eect operating
through the incentives to embezzle: More unstable incumbents have a greater incentive to steal resources
now instead of leaving them to future periods when they are likely to be out of oce. While rms do have
some incentive to oer bribes to the incumbent so long as  > 0, the expected returns from these licenses
14In this basic framework, we thus have a \cleaning-up" property, in which any amount of the period-0 endowment in excess
of the steady state value of Kt is consumed immediately and the economy reaches a steady state with a constant level of
corruption in one period. This \cleaning-up" property holds whenever the incumbent's per-period utility is linear in Et.
15The dierence between comparative statics in steady state and in transition has to do with whether the pool of resources
at the start of the period is exogenous, or whether this is taken to be the steady state value of Kt. More precisely, a change in
 will shift the economy towards a new steady state;  0 thus captures the short-run behavior of corruption in transition, while
 t (t  1) describes the behavior of corruption in the new steady state. From the expressions in (4) and (5), it is clear that
the response of corruption to  is qualitatively similar in both transition and steady state, so long as K0 is suciently large.
Note also that a quick substitution of  =
1
AF into the expressions for  0 and  t from the two cases shows that corruption
is indeed a continuous function of stability for all periods.
8are small, so that any bribes oered are insucient to persuade the incumbent to substitute away from
embezzlement.
Turning to Case 2, notice from (5) that  now enters the expression for  t in two places, which generate
opposite eects on the level of corruption. The inuence of  on corruption thus involves a rich interplay
between a horizon eect { since the optimal amount of licensing also takes into consideration the tradeo
with respect to leaving resources to the future { and a new demand eect, whereby rms are willing to pay
higher bribes to more stable incumbents. It is the latter eect that tends to make corruption increase in
stability. It turns out that when  is suciently small (  1
2), diminishing returns set in fast enough in the
accumulation equation for Kt, so that it is relatively unattractive for the incumbent to set resources aside
for the future. In this situation, the demand eect unambiguously prevails over the horizon eect. If on the
other hand we have  > 1
2, the demand eect still prevails over some range of stability, so long as licensing
represents a suciently large source of corruption rents for the incumbent (AF is large enough). Now,
however, the horizon eect may kick in again at the highest levels of stability, as very stable incumbents
may nd it worthwhile to allow some resources to accumulate into the future instead of disbursing more
licenses.16 In short, the general lesson is that corruption will be increasing over some range of stability,
while possibly but not necessarily becoming decreasing in stability at the highest levels of .
Bringing these two cases together, we have our central proposition on how stability aects corruption
in steady state:
Proposition 1 Suppose that K0 > A
1
1 ()

1  (so that K0 exceeds the steady state level of resources in
the economy), and AF > maxf2;1g. Then:
(i) If   1
2, steady-state corruption is decreasing in stability  for  <   1
AF , and increasing in 
for  > .
(ii) If  > 1
2, steady-state corruption is decreasing in stability  for  < , increasing in  for
 <  <   1
2, and decreasing in  for  > .
In words, our model generates a steady state where at rst corruption decreases with stability, and
eventually starts to increase (with a possibility that it starts to decrease once again for very high levels of
stability). Put dierently, we end up with a non-monotonic relationship between corruption and stability,
which will look like a U-shape so long as diminishing returns play an important role in the accumulation
of resources: Very stable and very unstable incumbents will tend to be more corrupt than those at an
intermediate range of stability.
The logic that drives this result is very intuitive, and it is the key message of our paper. In the range
of low stability, rms are unwilling to pay high bribes to unstable incumbents, so that embezzlement
16Specically, we have from (5) that
d t
d = AF(1 2), for all t  1. A necessary and sucient condition for
d t
d  0 for
all  2 [
;1] is  
1
2. If  >
1
2, then corruption will increase for  <
1
2  
, while
d t
d < 0 for values of  that exceed

. Note that a necessary and sucient condition to ensure that 0 < 
 < 1 and 
 > 
 is AF > maxf2;1g, so that
revenues from licensing will be suciently large to allow the demand eect to gain salience over some range of .
9becomes the main means for self-enrichment. As a result, the horizon eect dominates: Corruption falls
as the incumbent's stability improves and the incentive to embezzle decreases. Beyond a certain level of
stability, however, licensing becomes the more protable option, as suciently stable incumbents are able
to extract larger bribes from rms. Therefore, the demand eect kicks in over the range of high stability
so long as AF is suciently large: Corruption increases as stability improves, since rms are willing to
oer ever larger amounts of bribes. This demand eect is sure to dominate over at least some range of high
stability, although the horizon eect, which naturally aects both types of corruption, may under some
circumstances regain the upper hand at the very highest levels of stability. The overall U-shaped pattern,
by which we mean that corruption decreases in stability for lower levels of , then eventually starts to
increase, is the key testable prediction of our model.
Furthermore, the model yields several interesting predictions on the eects of parameter shifts:
Proposition 2 Based on the expressions for steady-state corruption in (4) and (5):
(i) Corruption is weakly increasing in the incumbent's bargaining power vis- a-vis the private sector, ,
and the productivity of the private sector technology, AF.
(ii) Over the range of  where the demand eect dominates, in response to a given rise in  or AF,
the increase in corruption is larger when the incumbent is more stable (ie  is higher).
Proof of Proposition 2. By inspection of (4) and (5), it is clear that  and AF increase corruption from
licensing while not aecting corruption from embezzlement. This establishes part (i) of the proposition.
For part (ii), it is easy to check from (5) that the cross-derivative with respect to AF and  is positive,
whenever  t is increasing in .
This proposition lends itself to a natural interpretation. Part (i) follows from the fact that corruption
revenues from the private sector rise when either the bargaining position of the government is strengthened
or when the private sector technology improves. As for part (ii), notice that  and AF aect the corruption
revenues from licensing, but not from embezzlement. As a result, these parameters gain salience in the
range of  where licensing dominates, resulting in a larger increase in corruption when the incumbent is
more stable. Note that our formulation takes  to be independent of , but one could also expect more
stable incumbents to command more bargaining power over the private sector. Incorporating this simple
extension would only reinforce the upward-sloping relationship between corruption and stability for the
high levels of  where the demand eect prevails.
2.3 General Case: Endogenous Stability
Armed with the intuition from this benchmark case, we now turn to consider the general formulation in
which the incumbent can divert resources to bolster his stability:  = (;g(P)). For concreteness, we
think of P, the desired level of public goods provision dened in section 2.1.2, as establishing a \ceiling"
10on stability, whereby any shortfall of public goods provision with respect to this level will weaken the
incumbent's position. We thus model stability, , as:
 = min(;g(P))
Note that this boils down to an assumption that public goods provision and intrinsic stability are (perfect)
complements from the standpoint of how they contribute to . In other words, polities that are intrinsically
more stable allow an incumbent to better translate spending on public goods into enhanced stability. Two
things are worth stressing in that regard, the rst one being that we do not need perfect complementarity:
Our results hold as long as there is sucient complementarity between the endogenous and exogenous
components of stability, so that  and g(P) co-vary together. Second, while this complementarity is
ultimately an empirical question (to which our results will speak indirectly), we believe there is a priori
good reason to consider it plausible. To the extent that the systemic component  is tied to deeper features
of the polity such as ethnic fractionalization, if  and P were instead substitutes, one would then expect
to see higher levels of endogenous public goods provision in more ethnically fractionalized countries, to try
to compensate for the poor systemic stability in these polities. This would be at odds however with the
empirical evidence that fractionalization tends to be associated with less public goods spending (Alesina,
Baqir and Easterly 1999). Moreover, one might then expect to observe no specic relationship between
ethnic fractionalization and overall political stability, (;g(P)), whereas it has instead been established
that the correlation between these two variables is indeed clearly negative (Alesina et al. 2003).
The incumbent's problem from the benchmark case, (3), can now be adapted as follows:
V (K0) = max
E00; L00; P00
fE0 +  min(;g(P0))AFLt + min(;g(P0))V (K1)g (6)
where K1 = A(K0   E0   L0   P0)
We can now state a result that mirrors Proposition 1 on the non-monotonic relationship between
corruption and stability:
Proposition 3 Suppose that g(P) belongs to the class of increasing concave functions g(P) = (cP),
where c > 0 and 0 <  < 1. Moreover, suppose that A and K0 are suciently large, and that AF > 2.
Then there exists ~ ; ~  2 [0;1], with ~  < ~ , such that:
(i) If   1
2, steady-state corruption is decreasing in stability  for  < ~ , and increasing in  for
 > ~ .
(ii) If  > 1
2, steady-state corruption is decreasing in stability  for  < ~ , increasing in  for
~  <  < ~ , and decreasing in  for  > ~ .
The proof of this proposition is similar to, albeit more extended than, that for the baseline model
(details available in a separate appendix upon request). Intuitively, when there is sucient complemen-
tarity between  and g(P), both of them co-vary together. At low levels of , the incumbent thus has
11little incentive to set aside resources for public goods, since this has little incremental eect on his actual
stability, so that corruption will be high when  is low. On the other hand, at high levels of , there is
some incentive to raise P; nevertheless, since the mechanism for improving stability (the function g())
exhibits diminishing returns, this rise in P is relatively moderate and does not detract from the fact that a
signicant quantum of resources is still being allocated to embezzlement or licensing. In short, corruption
remains high when  is high. It is moreover straightforward to see that the comparative statics from
Proposition 2 continue to hold in this extension.
On a separate note, we are now in a position to derive a testable implication concerning how corruption
and stability co-vary with the level of public goods provision. In our model, we interpret public goods
provision as equivalent to the size of government, given that P is the only form of government expenditure.
This yields the following result:
Proposition 4 [Size of Government] Given the same parameter conditions as in Proposition 3, if
corruption is U-shaped with respect to stability, then corruption also stands in a U-shaped relationship with
respect to the size of government.
Proof of Proposition 4. Public goods provision is weakly increasing in the level of intrinsic stability,
given the complementarity between  and P. Thus, the relationship between corruption and the size of
government inherits the same shape as that between corruption and (intrinsic) stability.
In words, governments which are either very small or very large are associated with more corruption,
but those of an intermediate size witness lower levels of corruption. In our model, the reason for this
pattern is that governments are very small or very large because they are (respectively) intrinsically highly
unstable or highly stable, and both of these extremes are associated with high levels of corruption.
2.4 Case Studies
The logic of our model can be vividly illustrated through a couple of country case studies. These exam-
ples highlight how the horizon and demand eects can be useful for understanding individual country's
experiences with corruption and political stability over time.
2.4.1 Brazil
Brazil in the 1990s is a clear example of a country that started with very low levels of stability and high
levels of corruption, but which later transitioned into a less corrupt regime as stability improved. Its
experience is therefore consistent with the \downward-sloping arm" of the U-shape between corruption
and stability, driven by the horizon eect.17
In the 1980s, Brazil underwent a transition from military rule to democracy. Soon afterwards however,
in 1992, the rst directly elected president in 29 years, Fernando Collor de Mello, became the rst Brazilian
17What follows draws upon Skidmore (1999), Geddes and Ribeiro Neto (1999) and Souza (1999).
12president to be impeached, as evidence of widespread and rampant corruption mounted against him and
his closest associates. According to Geddes and Ribeiro Netto (1999, p.22), it is apparent that \corruption
did increase in Brazil during the 1980s and early 1990s::: The amounts of money described and numbers
of people implicated in corruption schemes investigated::: are substantially greater than those described
in earlier inquiries." Similarly, Skidmore (1999, p.8) describes the levels of corruption during the Collor
administration as \unprecedented".
One feature consistently stressed by many scholars that have studied this period was the high level of
instability. The electoral rules created during the democratic transition led to a proliferation of political
parties, so that it became extremely hard for the chief executive to build a stable coalition. No less than 17
parties were represented in Congress by 1990, with the three largest delegations not adding up to a simple
majority. Collor's party, despite his winning the presidential election, held only 6.3% of the legislative seats
as the new administration took oce. That the president was impeached during his third year in oce
is itself illustrative of how unstable his administration was. The president's ability to push through his
policies was severely limited, and Geddes and Ribeiro Neto (1999) argue explicitly that this institutional
setup was central in explaining the increase in corruption.
Observers have also linked the short time horizons of public ocials during this period to the high
levels of corruption, which is precisely what we have termed the horizon eect. For instance, Geddes and
Ribeiro Neto (1999) stress that, in light of their unimpressive professional status, \many of the appointed
members of Collor's original team could expect only a short term in oce::: [and] the temptation to `take
the money and run' increased" (p.42). In short, there is clear evidence of a link between an environment
of high instability and high levels of corruption, with a strong embezzlement component.
Following Collor's impeachment, the corruption situation is widely seen to have improved as stability
increased over time under the Itamar Franco (1992-1994) and the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administra-
tions (1995-2002), as is consistent with our theory. The coalition that elected Cardoso held nearly one-half
of all congressional seats, and was reputed to be \fairly stable", while Cardoso himself came \from a party
of respectable size and reasonable coherence" (p.45). Add to this the approval in 1997 of a constitutional
amendment allowing for reelection to executive oces, and what emerged was a context of signicantly
improved stability. Consequently, Geddes and Ribeiro Neto (1999) argue that the `take the money and run'
temptation \lessened in post-Collor administrations. Franco's appointees... had every reason to expect
their careers in public life to continue afterward [and] Cardoso's appointments to high-ranking positions
include many of the best economists in the country, as well as able professionals in other elds... [S]uch
appointees have a longer time horizon" (p.42). At the same time, various institutional measures to ght
corruption were also implemented. These included a law to regulate government procurement (Lei de
Licita c~ oes), which is acknowledged to have been an eective tool in reducing corruption (Gon calves da
Silva 2000), as well as a law requiring public oceholders to disclose personal assets and income sources,
both introduced in 1993. Such measures culminated with the establishment in 2001 of the Controladoria-
13Geral da Uni~ ao, a widely praised anti-corruption agency at the ministerial level (Ferraz and Finan 2007).
We thus conclude that the case of Brazil in the 1990s provides support for the mechanisms behind the
\downward-sloping arm" of the U-shape in our theory.
2.4.2 Mexico
Mexico illustrates the converse phenomenon: A country that started with very high levels of stability and
corruption, which later became less corrupt as the absolute stability of the regime weakened.
Starting in 1929, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was in power in Mexico for more than
seven decades without interruption. This was undoubtedly a very stable regime, under control of the
president whose powers were \almost those of a monarch" (Preston and Dillon 2004, p.52). The president
himself selected party candidates for congressional posts, and turned the PRI-dominated legislature into
a rubber-stamping machine for his decisions. Although reelection was prohibited, long political horizons
were guaranteed by the fact that the president got to pick the party's candidate for his succession { which
amounted to anointing his successor, in a process nicknamed dedazo (\nger tap") { and the \unwritten
rule that former presidents and their families would not be criticized, let alone prosecuted" (p.57).
Our theory would therefore predict high levels of corruption as a result, as is indeed the conclusion of
just about every observer. According to Preston and Dillon (2004), \among the system's basic codes of
conduct, corruption seemed to be one of the most fundamental" (p.57). Moreover, the demand eect would
predict that licensing and bribery would have been an important part of the way corruption manifested
itself. This is conrmed by existing accounts: \With business heavily dependent on government contracts,
the lines between the public and private sectors were often blurred. An executive receiving a substantial
government contract would include in his cost calculations, as a matter of course, a commission for the
ocial who approved the deal... [G]overnment ocials often became silent partners in the deals they
authorized" (p.184). Indeed, this link between stability and corruption in the PRI regime has not gone
unnoticed: \Authoritarian rule tended to breed corruption. Because PRI ocials were nally accountable
to no one but the President, it behooved special interests to ply them with bribes, and with the President
drawn from the same party over the decades, incoming administrations had little incentive to clean house
or punish abuses by their predecessors" (p.326).
Starting in the 1990s, however, stability started to decrease towards a more moderate level consistent
with a better-functioning democracy, and this transition appears to have been accompanied by some
reduction in corruption, in line with our model. Ernesto Zedillo became president in 1994 after the dedazo
system was disrupted by the assassination of Carlos Salinas' anointed successor. Zedillo implemented
reforms in the electoral process that reduced the party's control over election results, and in 1997, for the
rst time in modern Mexican history, the PRI was left with less than 50% of the seats in the lower house
of Congress. As a culmination of this process, the opposition won the 2000 presidential elections behind
Vicente Fox. Fox's party, however, controlled less than 40% of the seats in both houses. Under these
14circumstances, \democratic checks were restricting his powers to a degree faced by no previous Mexican
president... [T]he Congress had become far more assertive, defeating a considerable percentage of the bills
he proposed and rewriting everything" (p.514).
While there is widespread disappointment that Fox did not live up fully to high public expectations on
corruption eradication, it has nevertheless been argued that the administration \actually made important
investments in the future of clean government ... bringing the anticorruption agency up to global standards"
(Rosenberg 2003). An acclaimed \freedom of information act" was also implemented. This suggests that
corruption has decreased somewhat. In short, the Mexican experience of falling corruption as stability
improved is consistent with the \upward-sloping arm" of our U-shape.
3 Empirics: Cross-Country Evidence
Having developed a set of theoretical predictions on the relationship between corruption and stability, we
turn now to the cross-country empirical evidence. We rst discuss the measures we employ, particularly
the variables that we use to capture stability (Section 3.1). Using this data, we demonstrate a systematic
U-shaped pattern linking corruption and stability, one that is remarkably robust to the use of dierent
corruption indices as well as measures of incumbent stability (Section 3.2). We also nd suggestive evidence
of a U-shaped relationship between corruption and the size of government, consistent with a key corollary
of the model (Section 3.3).
3.1 Measures of Corruption Perception and Political Stability
3.1.1 Corruption Perception
Corruption is a particularly dicult phenomenon to quantify, much less compare across countries, given
the illicit nature of such transactions. Following much of the cross-country empirical literature, we focus
therefore on indices of corruption perception that are based on institutional assessments or surveys.18 Our
main dependent variable is the \Control of Corruption" measure from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
(2006), a comprehensive eort that pools together country governance indices from disparate sources. In
all, 31 indices from 25 dierent organizations (such as Gallup International, the World Bank, and the
World Economic Forum) were collected and aggregated using an unobserved components methodology,
yielding an extensive dataset with more than 150 countries. KKM reports scores between 1996-2002 at
two-year intervals, and thereafter for 2002-2005 on an annual basis.
We also use two other leading corruption indicators to corroborate our results, namely the Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The CPI is released annually
by Transparency International, a global anti-corruption civic organization. Like KKM, it also combines
institutional assessments of corruption, but uses a non-parametric aggregation procedure instead. The
18See Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) for a detailed response to criticisms against such corruption measures.
15CPI is deliberately more selective in its choice of indices included in the aggregation; the 2005 CPI, for
example, was based on 16 indices from 10 dierent organizations (see Lambsdor 2005 for details). As
a result, the CPI is available for slightly fewer countries, exceeding 100 countries only after 2001. The
aggregation approach adopted by KKM and the CPI is intended to reduce the eects of biases that might
be inherent in any single source index. To further screen out potentially less reliable data points, we
dropped all observations that were based on fewer than three source indices in our analysis. (None of our
conclusions change if we instead use all the data points; results available on request.)
Our third and nal corruption index { the ICRG { is based on a distinct methodology independently
developed by Political Risk Services, a private country risk assessment agency. The ICRG country ratings
cover a broad set of political and economic categories, including one component on corruption within
the political system. These ratings are available on a commercial basis { ICRG clients are understood
to include rms seeking business opportunities overseas { and so the ICRG corruption score focuses on
aspects of corruption that are pertinent to the conduct of private business. The ICRG is released on a
monthly basis for up to 140 countries. We averaged the monthly corruption scores to obtain an annual
measure, when all 12 months of corruptions ratings were available.19
For comparability, we linearly re-scaled all three measures so that they range between  2.5 and 2.5,
with higher values corresponding to more perceived corruption. Overall, the three indices are very highly
correlated. The KKM and CPI country mean scores (averaged over 2002-2005) sport a high correlation
coecient of 0.98. The correlation with the 2002-2005 ICRG country average is only slightly lower (0.88
with KKM and 0.90 with the CPI), which suggests that the ICRG may be picking up on slightly dierent
dimensions of country corruption.20 These indices provide a natural starting point for our empirical tests
of the U-shaped relationship between total corruption and political stability, since they in principle provide
assessments of overall corruption, without excluding specic corrupt activities { such as embezzlement or
licensing { that are subject to the dierent eects highlighted in our theory. The CPI, for example, states
that its component sources are selected from surveys that do not emphasize one form of corruption over
another (Lambsdor 2005, p.5).21 While the ICRG focuses more on political corruption such as close ties
between politicians and rms, it does not exclude more direct and petty forms of extortion and bribery
that hinder the regular conduct of business activities.
19It should be noted that the ICRG is a component index used in KKM, but not in the CPI.
20The high level of agreement between alternative corruption perception indices is also noted by Svensson (2005).
21\It has been suggested in numerous publications that distinctions should be made between these forms of corruption, e.g.
between nepotism and corruption in the form of monetary transfers. Yet, none of the data included in the CPI emphasize one
form of corruption at the expense of other forms. The sources can be said to aim at measuring the same broad phenomenon.
As also emphasized in the background documents of previous years, the sources do not distinguish between administrative
and political corruption, nor between petty and grand corruption." (Lambsdor 2005)
163.1.2 Political Stability
Turning to our key explanatory variable, we worked with two distinct sets of stability measures, the rst of
which focuses on the historically-observed average length of incumbent tenures. We view this as a simple
means to capture how long a political incumbent can expect to hold onto the reins of executive power
given recent conditions in the country, with a longer average tenure corresponding to a higher level of
incumbent stability. To construct this measure, we used an encyclopedia { WorldStatesmen.org { that
compiles chronologies of heads of state and heads of government for countries and territories around the
world, including their party aliation and dates of political transitions. This encyclopedia is extremely
comprehensive and regularly updated (political changes in real-time are typically updated within a week),
while also fully disclosing the list of sources and contributors consulted in assembling the chronologies. As
a cross-check, we compared the accounts in WorldStatesmen.org for consistency with Beck et al.'s (2001)
Database of Political Institutions (DPI), to corroborate the years in which political transitions occurred
(see the Data Appendix for details).22
We construct these average tenure measures using a 20-year window. Specically, for each year in
our sample, we calculate average tenure as 20 divided by one plus the number of observed government
changes that took place in the preceding 20 years. Two separate variables were constructed counting
respectively changes in individual chief executives, and changes in the party holding the seat of chief
executive. While political titles dier across countries, we took the chief executive to be the de facto head
of government as coded in the DPI.23 In particular, for most communist states, we follow the DPI in coding
the secretary-general of the communist party as the chief executive.24 For our purposes, we treat military
rulers and independents as separate and distinct parties, while also counting all interim and acting heads
of government. We count situations in which an incumbent switches party aliation while in power as a
change in party. We adopt these mechanical rules to avoid making judgement calls about how substantial
these changes to the political scene were; implicitly, this rule views the need for an acting head or for a
change in party allegiance to be a signal of some potential instability in the political status quo.
We report results using both \Executive Tenure" and \Party Tenure", since good arguments can be
made in favor of both as measures of the relevant decision-making horizon of political oce-holders. On the
one hand, \Executive Tenure" likely understates political stability in countries, such as Japan and Mexico,
22We did not use the DPI as our main source, since it documents the identity and party of the chief executive as of 1
January of each year, and does not record instances of multiple changes within a calendar year.
23Panama oers an example of a country where the nominal head of government did not command real executive power
for a long period. General Manuel Noriega is coded by the DPI as the chief executive between 1982-1989, even though he
never assumed the formal post of President. There are also a handful of countries in which the post to which chief executive
powers are attached switched midway during the sample period. For example, Bangladesh switched from a presidential to a
parliamentary system in 1992. Our codings follow whoever the chief executive is, as designated in the DPI, regardless of the
exact title of the relevant post.
24An exception here is China under Deng Xiaoping, who never held the position of secretary-general, although he was the
unquestioned de facto leader from 1978 until his death in 1997. Our codings designate Deng as the chief executive during
these years, although this is inconsequential for the average party tenure measure.
17which experienced regular turnover of heads of government, even though the ruling party (the LDP and
PRI respectively) remained entrenched for several decades. On the other hand, changes in individual chief
executives are often accompanied by turnover across the government hierarchy and patronage networks,
in which case the decision-making horizon for corrupt agents would be better captured by \Executive
Tenure" rather than by \Party Tenure". It is reassuring therefore that our empirical results work well
with either tenure measure.
When constructing these variables, we adopt a 20-year window to allow a suciently long period over
which to assess the average duration of an incumbent's stay in power. With the rst year in the KKM
sample being 1996, the earliest window we use is 1976-1995, so we can calculate average tenure using a full
20-year window for countries that became independent prior to 1976. This covers most of the countries
that gained independence in the post-World War II wave of decolonization. For countries that gained
independence more recently, we can still calculate average tenure using only the years since independence,
but this comes at the cost of introducing more noise as we shorten the window over which the average
is taken. For this reason, we typically exclude these young countries (most of which are from the former
Soviet Union) from our sample. In our preferred specications, we also drop Switzerland since average
tenure is arguably a poor proxy for political stability in this instance: The Swiss have practised a unique
seven-member presidency for more than 150 years, in which the post of chief executive rotates yearly
among the seven members, and thus the average tenure of individual chief executives severely understates
how stable the polity is.25
Our second measure of political stability is more straightforward to describe. We focus here on the
strength of the incumbent's position in the country's legislative body. To this eect, we use the \Majority"
variable from the DPI, which is equal to the share of seats in the legislature occupied by the governing party
or coalition. A higher fraction of seats controlled by the ruling party would imply a lower likelihood of
the opposition impeding policy decisions (including decisions, for example, to award licenses and contracts
to favored private rms) or attempting to oust the incumbent, so that higher values of \Majority" would
correspond to more incumbent stability.
3.2 The U-shape between Corruption and Stability
We proceed to our results on the robust U-shaped relationship between corruption and incumbent stability.
We consider evidence from two types of empirical specications: (i) Cross-section regressions, where the
dependent variable is the average corruption score from 2002-2005 for each country; and (ii) Regressions
where the dependent variable is the corruption score from individual years pooled across all years from
1996-2005. Since all three corruption indices display a high level of persistence over time, it is natural
to attempt rst to identify any relationship between corruption and stability at the cross-country level
25In practice, our results from the cross-section regressions do not change much when we include Switzerland; results
available upon request.
18through the cross-section regressions.26 We then turn to the pooled regressions to make full use of all the
years of information at our disposal. Here, we also use dynamic panel techniques that allow us to account
for country xed eects, while instrumenting for political stability to address potential problems arising
from reverse causality.
3.2.1 Average Incumbent Tenure
We present rst the results from the cross-section regressions using average incumbent tenure as our
measure of political stability. In order to pick up the non-monotonic relationship between corruption and
stability, we include both stability and its square on the right-hand side of our regressions. Specically,
we estimate the following via ordinary least-squares:
Corrupi = 0 +   Stabi + 2  (Stabi)2 + XXi + "i (7)
where i indexes country. The dependent variable, Corrupi, is the mean corruption score from 2002-2005,
where the sample includes only those countries for which all 4 years of corruption scores were available.
We use \Executive Tenure" and \Party Tenure" as measures of political stability, Stabi, in Tables 1
and 2 respectively. Xi denotes additional determinants of corruption included as control variables, with
X being the corresponding coecient vector. Since our focus here is on the long-run determinants of
corruption, the explanatory variables on the right-hand side of (7) are averages over the same lagged
window used in the construction of the average tenure variable unless otherwise stated (this is 1982-2001
in most columns). We report Huber-White robust standard errors for the coecient estimates, to account
for possible heteroskedasticity in the residuals, "i. (Appendix Table 1 provides summary statistics for the
variables used in this cross-section analysis, while the Data Appendix documents how these variables were
collected or constructed.)
[INSERT TABLE 1A]
Table 1A reveals a clear, robust U-shaped relationship between the KKM corruption index and political
stability as measured by the average tenure of the chief executive. Throughout Columns (1)-(6), we obtain
a negative signicant coecient on log \Executive Tenure", and a positive signicant coecient on log
\Executive Tenure" squared. Corruption is thus decreasing in stability for low ranges of average tenure,
while increasing in stability at high ranges. The estimates imply a U-shape with a fairly stable turning
point, with corruption reaching its minimum at around 7-9 years of executive tenure in our full specications
in Columns (5) and (6). The last row conrms that this turning point lies in the interior of the relevant
window of 0-20 years with a high probability (typically in excess of 95%), as calculated from 1,000 Monte
Carlo draws from the asymptotic multivariate normal distribution of the coecient estimates.
26The correlation between the KKM scores (and likewise for the CPI) in any two years between 1996-2005 is in excess of
0.9. The ICRG is slightly less persistent over time, with a pairwise correlation between any two years exceeding 0.68.
19Column (1) presents a bare-bones regression, in which only log \Executive Tenure" and its square are
included on the right-hand side. We already nd evidence in this minimal specication of a U-shaped
relationship between corruption and stability, although the R2 is understandably low (= 0:03) given the
small number of covariates.27 Column (2) introduces log real GDP per capita (from the World Development
Indicators, WDI) and its square, as well as region dummies, to help to control for any components in the
corruption index that might be systematically correlated with a country's overall economic performance.
Not surprisingly, the income coecient comes out negative and highly signicant; the squared term suggests
some concavity in the relationship between corruption and income, but the overall pattern is consistent
with the stylized fact that richer countries are perceived as being less corrupt.
This U-shaped pattern continues to be remarkably robust to the introduction of many other explanatory
variables for corruption advanced in the literature. Column (3) adds a measure of ethnic fractionaliza-
tion (from Alesina et al. 2003), democracy (from the Polity IV database), and a full set of legal origin
dummies. Consistent with Treisman (2000), we nd that democracies tend to be less corrupt (signicant
at the 10% level). While the regression does suggest that ethnic fragmentation is associated with more
corruption (Mauro 1995), this eect is not statistically signicant. Despite the inclusion of these important
determinants of corruption, the KKM index retains its signicant U-shape with respect to log \Executive
Tenure".28 We add in Column (4) a set of variables associated with economic rents, proposed by Ades and
Di Tella (1999). Following their lead, we control for fuel and ore exports (normalized by total exports)
to capture the availability of expropriable rents, while we proxy for the degree of competition that the
domestic economy is exposed to with the value of imports normalized by GDP. Column (5) adds several
variables capturing characteristics of political systems. Following Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003), we
include an indicator variable for whether legislative seats are allocated under a plurality vote rule, which
in principle promotes more accountability from individual politicians and should thus reduce corrupt be-
havior.29 We also control for inverse district magnitude (number of electoral districts divided by seats),
where the intuition is that smaller districts help to improve accountability. Last but not least, we include
a measure for presidentialism, following Kunicova's (2005) argument that presidential systems tend to be
associated with more corruption. The results in Table 1A conrm that controlling for these additional
determinants does not detract from the signicance of the U-shape with respect to executive tenure.
We subject our central nding to a series of robustness tests in the remaining columns. Given the
small number of observations in these cross-section regressions, a key concern would be whether any
27While we have also experimented with a cubic polynomial in stability in the regressions, none of the coecients in log
\Executive Tenure", its square or its cube show up as statistically signicant. Given the limited number of data points in the
regression, it does not appear practical to attempt to t a cubic specication.
28The U-shape remains robust if we add the ethnic fractionalization, democracy, or legal origin dummies into the regression
separately; regressions available on request.
29Our results are similar if we use a more continuous measure of plurality that equals 1 if all seats are won under plurality
rule; 2/3 if a majority of seats are won under plurality rule but some are allocated under proportional representation (PR)
rules; 1/3 if a majority of seats are allocated under PR with a minority won by a plurality vote; and 0 if all legislative seats
are allocated under PR rules.
20outliers or inuential observations might be driving our results. Column (6) demonstrates that the U-
shape remains robust even when we drop those observations that are deemed potentially inuential for the
coecient estimates under the Cook's distance criterion (Cook 1977), which recommends further exploring
observations for which the Cook's distance metric exceeds 4/(sample size).30 Column (7) examines what
happens when we use a shorter 10-year window in computing executive tenure (the auxillary controls
in this regression are 10-year averages over 1992-2001, the same years covered by the tenure window).
We continue to obtain a U-shape, although the coecient on squared stability is now just marginally
insignicant at the 10% level. It is worth noting too that the point estimates on the coecients of log
\Executive Tenure" and its square are both smaller in magnitude (attenuated towards zero) when compared
to the corresponding full specication in Column (5). This is consistent with the interpretation that the
tenure measure constructed with the 10-year window is subject to more classical measurement error, and
that a suciently long window is necessary to compute average tenure more precisely.31 We return in
Column (8) to the use of a 20-year window, but construct our tenure measure with a window (1986-2005)
that overlaps contemporaneously with the corruption variables on the left-hand side. We once again nd a
robust U-shaped pattern, similar to the full specication using a lagged window instead. (The controls in
this specication are averages over 2002-2005, or 2002-2004 when 2005 data is not available; the results are
similar using 1986-2005 averages.) Finally, Column (9) veries that our central ndings are not aected
when we run the regressions using average tenure in years (instead of log tenure). That said, our preferred
specications are those that use log tenure, since the tenure measures are by construction proportional to
the reciprocal of the number of changes of chief executive and thus display a lot of right skew.32
[INSERT TABLE 1B]
Table 1B conrms that the U-shaped relationship between corruption and log \Executive Tenure"
continues to hold with other leading corruption indices. We perform here the same regression specications
in Table 1A using the CPI and the ICRG mean scores as dependent variables instead (for expositional
brevity, the table does not report the coecients on the auxillary controls). Using the CPI scores in the
top panel, the U-shape with respect to log \Executive Tenure" remains a consistent feature of the data
despite the smaller number of CPI observations. While we do lose statistical signicance on the squared
stability term when we experiment with a 10-year window (Column (7)) or a contemporaneous window
(Column (8)), this does not detract much from the central message of a U-shape with respect to stability
30Our results hold when alternative measures of inuence are used to trim the dataset, such as the DFITS metric (Welsch
and Kuh 1977), Welsch distance (Welsch 1982), or the COVRATIO criterion (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch 1980).
31Not surprisingly, when we use an even shorter 5-year window for computing average tenure, the coecients on stability
and its square are even further attenuated towards zero and no longer statistically signicant. Note also that if we include
countries that gained independence after 1982 by calculating average tenure using a truncated window starting in their year
of independence, we nd a similar attenuation in the coecients of stability and its square, once again suggesting that the
shortened window results in an average tenure measure that is more noisy.
32We have in eect been penalizing ourselves by using log tenure, as the U-shaped relationship between corruption and
stability is even more statistically signicant when tenure is left un-logged (results available on request).
21with an interior turning point. Our central results also hold with the ICRG mean scores (bottom panel).
Although the results weaken a little as we move towards the full specication in Column (5), and when we
trim the dataset using the Cook's distance criterion in Column (6), the point estimates remain consistent
with a U-shape. Overall, the strength of the U-shape is quite remarkable, especially in light of the small
cross-section sample size and the extensive set of control variables used.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
Table 2 repeats our cross-section regression exercise using \Party Tenure" as the measure of stability
instead. We once again nd evidence of a U-shaped pattern, particularly between the KKM corruption
index and log \Party Tenure" (top panel). Not surprisingly, the implied turning point corresponds to a
longer average tenure compared to Table 1A (equal to 16.38 years in our full specication in Column (5),
or 11.70 years in Column (6) when trimming inuential observations using the Cook's distance criterion),
reecting the higher frequency of turnover in individual chief executives compared to changes in the party in
power.33 It is also reassuring that our coecients on average party tenure and its square are most precisely
estimated when we parse our sample down in Column (6) to omit potentially inuential observations. Our
results are slightly weaker when the CPI mean score is used (middle panel), with the coecient on the
squared party tenure term tending to drop out of the range of conventional statistical signicance in several
specications. In the bottom panel with the ICRG mean score, we generally nd favorable evidence of a
U-shaped relationship with respect to log \Party Tenure", although this is not statistically signicant in
Column (5) with the full set of control variables.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
Figure 2 neatly summarizes this relationship between corruption and the average tenure measures. The
vertical axis in Figure 2A plots the residuals from the KKM index after controlling for all the right-hand
side variables in our Column (5) specication, except for log \Executive Tenure" and its square. Figure
2B does the same for the log \Party Tenure" measure. Both the quadratic t and a non-parametric kernel
regression clearly illustrate the non-monotonic pattern between corruption and stability, with corruption
being on average higher in countries that exhibit either very high or very low incumbent tenure lengths,
and being on average lower in countries in an intermediate range of political stability.34
Our next step is to analyze the results when pooling together the observations from each individual
year (between 1996-2005). For this, we run ordinary least-squares regressions of the form:
Corrupit =   Stabi;t 1 + 2  (Stabi;t 1)2 + XXi;t 1 + Dt + i + "it (8)
33The relatively lower Monte Carlo probability of an interior turning point is a consequence of this longer average party
tenure, since the turning point is located closer to the upper bound of the (0;20) interval.
34In Figure 2B, the kernel regression appears to suggest that there is a nal downward-sloping arm to the non-monotonic
relationship at the highest levels of average party tenure, as our theory would predict in the case where  is suciently large
(diminishing returns do not set in too rapidly in the accumulation process for resources). We do not wish to over-emphasize
this point however, given the limited data points available.
22where i indexes country, and t indexes year. We run all regressions with year xed eects, Dt, since both
the KKM and CPI indices are normalized in each year and thus cannot be compared cardinally across
years. We use one-year lagged values for all the explanatory variables, including our measures of political
stability, in order to reduce the possibility of reverse causality. (As before, Xi;t 1 denotes a set of additional
control variables. Regression results using contemporaneous instead of lagged control variables are similar
and available on request.) Note that our average tenure measures for each year are now calculated using
a lagged 20-year moving window. Since the earliest window used is 1976-1995 (to calculate average tenure
leading up to 1996), we retain only those countries in our dataset that were independent by 1976; as
before, we also drop the Swiss observation. Last but not least, we allow for within-country correlation in
the residuals (induced by the country-specic error term, i), and therefore report robust standard errors
clustered by country. (We present an alternative specication with country xed eects when we turn to
our dynamic panel estimation later below.)
[INSERT TABLE 3]
Table 3 presents the results when the measure of stability is log \Executive Tenure". Column (1) is a
minimum specication run with the KKM index as the dependent variable and with only year xed eects
as additional controls, while Column (2) includes the entire set of control variables which we saw in the
full specication in Column (5) of Tables 1 and 2. Both columns demonstrate that the U-shape between
corruption and average executive tenure continues to hold in the pooled sample, with a turning point that
is comparable to that from the prior cross-section regressions. (The results are similarly strong with more
parsimonious sets of auxillary controls such as in Columns (2)-(4) of Tables 1 and 2.)
We extend the analysis in Column (3) to test the predictions from Proposition 2 relating to the
bargaining strength of the incumbent, . To see its eects on the U-shaped relationship between corruption
and stability, we introduce  into the regression and also interact it with both stability and its square:
Corrupit =   Stabi;t 1 + 2  (Stabi;t 1)2 + i + ;  iStabi;t 1 + 2;  i(Stabi;t 1)2
+XXi;t 1 + Dt + i + "it (9)
We consider two possible proxies for . We rst use a measure of the regulatory barriers to starting
a business, from the World Bank's Doing Business database, which is based on the data methodology
developed by Djankov et al. (2002). Specically, this  proxy is the number of days (averaged over 2003-
2005, and re-scaled to lie between 0 and 1) needed to set up a new business following all ocial procedures.
In principle, by imposing high and costly barriers to entry, an incumbent is in a position to extract a higher
share of the rents enjoyed by the private sector, as rms will have to make more concessions to circumvent
such regulatory hold-up. A second  proxy which we consider is the \Regulatory Quality" governance
index from KKM.35 Constructed in much the same way as KKM's \Control of Corruption" index, this
35We thank a referee for suggesting this alternative proxy for the political incumbent's bargaining power.
23measure aggregates institutional assessments of country government's ability to \formulate and implement
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development" (KKM, p. 4). We
use the negative of this index as an alternative proxy for governmental regulatory hold-up.36
While these proxies are admittedly imperfect, the results are encouraging. Column (3) presents the
regressions using the \Days" proxy. First of all, it conrms that the basic U-shaped pattern with respect
to \Executive Tenure" still holds.37 Furthermore, the results are consistent with the comparative statics in
Proposition 2: The coecient on the interaction term between log \Executive Tenure" and our  proxy is
positive and statistically signicant at the 5% level. To be fully precise, the net interaction eect between
these two variables is given by the empirical cross-derivative of corruption with respect to stability and
, which is equal to ; + 22;(log \Executive Tenure"). This empirical cross-derivative is indeed
positive when evaluated at the median value of log \Executive Tenure" in the regression sample, and we
can formally reject the null hypothesis that this net interaction eect is equal to zero (p-value = 0:002).
This result is best illustrated in a diagram: Figure 3A shows that when the value of \Days" is increased,
the U-shaped curve between the corruption residuals and stability is shifted up, with this shift being
more pronounced at higher levels of executive tenure. Thus, an increase in the bargaining power of the
incumbent generates a larger increase in corruption at higher levels of stability.38 Using a one-year lag of
the \Regulatory Quality" index as our  proxy instead in Column (5), we obtain very similar results: The
interaction coecient between the  proxy and log \Executive Tenure" is positive and signicant, and we
also reject the null hypothesis of a zero net interaction eect at the 10% level (p-value = 0:078).
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
We explore in Columns (4) and (6) a means to exploit the panel structure of our dataset more exten-
sively, in a way that also helps to allay concerns over potential endogeneity issues arising from unobserved
country xed characteristics or reverse causality. Consider the following model:
Corrupit =   Stabi;t 1 + 2  (Stabi;t 1)2 + ;  iStabi;t 1 + 2;  i(Stabi;t 1)2
+XXi;t 1 + Dt + Di + "it (10)
which is similar to (9), except that we have now included Di as a country xed eect. Estimating (10)
using conventional xed eects is likely to lead to biased coecient estimates, since our key right-hand side
variable, the stability of the political incumbent, as well as country income per capita, are both plausibly
going to depend on the level of observed corruption in preceding periods. In other words, the error term,
"it, is not strictly exogenous as required under xed eects estimation (Corr("it;Stabi;t+s) 6= 0, for s  0).
36As with the KKM corruption index, we drop those \Regulatory Quality" observations that are based on fewer than three
component indices.
37For all specications where the interaction eect with a  proxy is considered, the turning point reported is that obtained
when setting the  proxy to its median value in the regression sample.
38These tests for Proposition 2 are only slightly weaker when run in the cross-section analysis. The coecients there have
similar signs, although signicance levels are lower given the small sample size in cross-section.
24To address this, we perform a dynamic panel GMM estimation using lagged levels of corruption, stability,
stability squared, stability interacted with \Days", stability squared interacted with \Days", \Days", log
income per capita, and log income per capita squared as instruments in the rst-dierenced version of (10)
for these right-hand side variables involving stability and income per capita (Arellano and Bond 1991). At
the same time, we also use lagged rst dierences of these variables as instruments in the levels version of
(10), to improve the eciency of the estimates, and allay concerns related to weak instruments when the
right-hand side variables are persistent (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998).39
This dynamic panel GMM estimation helps to reinforce the message from the prior OLS regressions:
In Column (4), we continue to obtain a statistically signicant quadratic U-shaped relationship linking
corruption and average tenure. The estimated coecient on the interaction between log \Executive Tenure"
and \Days" remains positive, although this is not signicant; that said, we do reject the null hypothesis of
a zero net interaction eect at the 10% level (p-value = 0.064).40 We nd mixed results when running the
dynamic panel estimation using the \Regulatory Quality" proxy in Column (6): We lose signicance on the
U-shape with respect to log \Executive Tenure", but obtain a positive and signicant net interaction eect
between log \Executive Tenure" and our  proxy (we reject the null hypothesis of a zero net interaction
eect; p-value = 0.001).
The remainder of Table 3 provides some reassurance that our results are similarly valid with both the
CPI and ICRG indices. We present the OLS and dynamic panel specications using lagged \Regulatory
Quality" as the  proxy as this has slightly more explanatory power for the dependent corruption variable
when compared to the \Days" proxy.41 (The results using the \Days" proxy are similar and available on
request.) The evidence points overall towards a U-shape with respect to log \Executive Tenure", as well as
a positive interaction eect with the  proxy (although the results are less signicant in the nal column
which subjects the ICRG index to the dynamic panel estimation).42
For completeness, Table 4 conducts the parallel exercise using \Party Tenure" as the measure of
incumbent stability, and we obtain strikingly similar results. The coecients on log \Party Tenure" and
its square continue to paint a consistent story regarding the non-monotonic relationship between corruption
and average tenure. Figure 3B illustrates this U-shaped pattern, and also makes evident the impact of
\Days" in increasing corruption particularly at higher levels of stability.
39We implement this using the xtabond2 Stata command developed in Roodman (2006).
40Several basic specication tests (not reported in Table 3) verify that the key underlying assumptions for the dynamic
panel model { including the requirement that "it be uncorrelated with past values of the right-hand side variables { are not
violated. We reject the null hypothesis of no rst-order serial correlation in the rst-dierences of the residuals at the 5% level
(p-value = 0.023). At the same time, we do not reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation (p-value =
0.104). The Sargan-Hansen statistic is small (
2(183) = 73:41), so we cannot reject the identifying restrictions for the validity
of the instruments (p-value = 1.000), subject to the caveat that this test tends to be weak when the set of instruments is large.
We also reach similar conclusions with these diagnostic tests in the Column (6) dynamic panel GMM specication using the
\Regulatory Quality" proxy.
41The KKM \Regulatory Quality" index is only available every two years from 1996-2002. When necessary, we associate
the index value for each year with the next year as well (for example, we associate the index value for 1996 with 1997 as well).
42Our results also hold in specications that use more parsimonious sets of control variables (regressions not shown).
25[INSERT TABLE 4]
We thus conclude that the evidence strongly supports the presence of a U-shaped relationship between
corruption and stability, when stability is measured by the historically observed average tenures of either
the chief executive or the party in power.
3.2.2 Legislative Majority
We turn briey then to consider the empirical evidence when political stability is measured instead by
the strength of the incumbent's position in the legislature, as proxied by \Majority". These results are
presented in Table 5, which summarizes ndings from both cross-section and pooled regressions.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
Reassuringly, our key conclusions are broadly unchanged. In the baseline cross-section KKM regression
in Column (1) that includes only \Majority" and its square as explanatory variables, we already nd a
signicant U-shaped pattern with an interior turning point which suggests that corruption bottoms out
when the incumbent's \Majority" is around 0.75 (when the ruling coalition holds about three-quarters of
the legislative seats). (As before, the right-hand side variables in these cross-section regressions are 20-year
lagged averages between 1982-2001, so we include only countries that were independent prior to 1982.)
This non-monotonic pattern in the cross-section persists with more parsimonious sets of auxillary controls,
or when we drop potentially inuential observations using the Cook's distance criterion (regressions not
shown). When we pool together all the yearly observations and use one-year lags of \Majority" as our key
explanatory variable following the specication in equation (8) with a full set of controls, the U-shape loses
statistical signicance (Column (2)).43 Nevertheless, statistical signicance is restored when we further
include the \Days" proxy in Column (3) following the specication in equation (9). We moreover nd
favorable evidence of a positive net interaction eect between \Majority" and our \Days" proxy for  (we
reject the null hypothesis of a zero net interaction eect; p-value = 0.007). Repeating this exercise with
the other corruption indices in the remaining columns of Table 5, we nd that the statistical signicance
of our results generally weakens. That said, in the full specications where the interaction eect of \Days"
on stability is also considered (Columns (6) and (9)), we nd particularly strong evidence for a U-shaped
relationship linking corruption and \Majority".44 Moreover, we again nd a positive net interaction eect
between stability and our \Days" proxy for the incumbent's bargaining power (p-value = 0.022 and 0.002
respectively in Columns (6) and (9)).
43We do not drop the newly independent countries or Switzerland, since the one-year lags of \Majority" are a valid measure
of legislative strength in these countries. Our results do not change substantially if we drop these countries.
44The Monte Carlo probability of the turning point lying in the interior of [0;1] is relatively small in Columns (6) and (9),
due to the fact that the point estimate of this turning point when evaluated at the median value of \Days" is already close to
the upper bound of this interval in both these specications.
263.3 Corruption and the Size of Government
Last but not least, we investigate the relationship between corruption and the size of government, motivated
by our earlier theoretical prediction (in Proposition 4) that this should also be a U-shaped pattern. The
relationship between these two variables has drawn some recent attention: Alesina and Angeletos (2005),
for instance, present a model in which a positive relation between corruption and the size of government is
taken as a premise, whereby a larger government implies a larger scope for rent-seeking activities. However,
this relationship has not been easy to verify empirically: Glaeser and Saks (2006), for example, nd no
signicant correlation between corruption convictions and the size of government at the state level in
the United States. Understanding the nature of the relationship between these two variables is clearly an
important topic in its own right, given the implications it bears for what an appropriate size of government
might be in order to minimize the incentives for public oce-holders to engage in corrupt activities.
As it turns out, we do nd some suggestive evidence of a U-shaped pattern linking corruption and the
size of government, as shown in Table 6. We use total government consumption expenditures as a share
of GDP, taken from the WDI, to proxy for the size of government, as is standard in this literature. We
focus rst on the cross-section regression specications, since this rids the analysis of budget cycle eects
that could confound interpretation of the results by averaging the data over several years.
[INSERT TABLE 6]
Column (1) reports a U-shaped pattern, signicant at the 1% level, between the mean KKM corruption
score and the size of government when no further controls are added. In this baseline specication,
corruption reaches its minimum when the level of government expenditures sits at about 20% of GDP.
This turning point lies well within the range of government sizes observed in the sample (between 0% and
50%). This relationship weakens when we add in a full set of controls (Column (2)), but is restored when
we turn to the pooled specication based on annual observations (Column (3)). When using the other
corruption measures, we nd in general that the statistical signicance of any U-shape with respect to
government size is strong in the minimum baseline specication, but weakens as we add further auxillary
controls. Overall though, the point estimates never overturn the basic U-shaped relationship. Of note,
throughout all specications, the Monte Carlo probability of the turning point lying in the interior of the
relevant [0;50] range is large (always in excess of 0.9).
In sum, we nd some suggestive evidence that corruption is decreasing in the size of government
for countries where the level of these government expenditures is low, but this relationship turns into a
positively-sloped one over high ranges of government expenditures.
274 Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated the relationship between the level of corruption and the degree of instability to
which political incumbents are exposed, both from theoretical and empirical perspectives. Our theoretical
framework predicts that corruption and stability are related in a non-monotonic pattern that approximates
a U-shape, building on the interaction between the horizon eect, by which a less stable incumbent is more
willing to embezzle, and the demand eect, according to which higher bribes will be oered to a more
stable incumbent.
On the empirical side, we nd that the cross-country evidence displays a U-shaped relationship between
corruption and political stability, as measured by historically-observed incumbent tenure lengths or by the
legislative majority of the government. This result is largely robust to the inclusion of many political
and economic control variables, as well as across various estimation methods. We see this robustness as
suggesting that cross-country corruption perception indices do contain useful information beyond their oft-
noted correlation with GDP per capita. (It is hard to believe that the nonlinear relationships uncovered
could be attributed to random noise.)
While the available empirical evidence supports the U-shaped prediction, a natural next step will be
to pursue tests to separately identify the horizon and demand eects within a common setting. In this
regard, we believe that turning to micro-level data is a promising direction along which to bridge theory
and empirics. Most encouragingly, some work based on Mexican rm-level data on corruption has already
tested our theory, with the preliminary results being quite supportive (Gamboa-Cavazos, Garza-Cant u and
Salinas 2006). Our hope is that further micro-level evidence will allow us to separately measure dierent
types of corruption along the lines suggested by the theory, and we intend to continue working in this
direction as part of this research agenda.
As a nal note, it is worth highlighting some policy implications stemming from our analysis. The
horizon eect suggests that the possibility of reelection should be an important incentive in defusing an
incumbent's tendency to embezzle. On the other hand, the demand eect cautions that long-standing
incumbents are more liable to engage in long-term illicit licensing relations with private rms. When these
two eects are combined, our theory implies that there is an optimal length of tenure at which the marginal
incentive to license more exactly osets the marginal disincentive to engage in more embezzlement. This
suggests that an electoral system in which there is the possibility of reelection, but which nevertheless
imposes term limits on politicians, is well-placed to approximate such an optimal compromise between the
horizon and demand eects. In fact, the data conrm that the length of executive tenure that minimizes
corruption { the \turning point" of the U-shape { is around eight years, remarkably close to the term limits
(two terms of four years) that are observed in practice in many countries. Advertently or inadvertently,
the designers of these electoral institutions appear to have built in a system that balances o the horizon
and demand eects highlighted in our analysis.
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6 Data Appendix
A. Corruption Perception Indices
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (KKM): From KKM's (2006) \Control of Corruption" index, itself
a composite of dierent corruption ratings aggregated by an unobserved components methodology.
On a scale of  2.5 to 2.5. The negative of the original index is used, so that higher numbers
correspond to more perceived corruption. Data are available for 1996-2002 at two-year intervals, and
thereafter for 2002-2005 on an annual basis. We drop all observations which were aggregated from
31less than three source indices. For the cross-section regressions, the dependent variable is the mean
KKM score from 2002-2005; we restrict the sample to only those countries where all four years of
data were available.
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): From Transparency International (TI). The CPI is linearly
re-scaled from its original range of 0 to 10, to a  2.5 to 2.5 scale, with higher numbers corresponding
to more perceived corruption. Data used are annual observations from 1996-2005. The CPI is also
based on corruption scores from dierent agencies, but its aggregation methodology is non-parametric
in nature, using only the ordinal ranks of each country. We use only those data points which CPI
aggregates based on at least three sources; these are the data points that TI reports in its annual
ranking of countries. For the cross-section regressions, the dependent variable is the mean score for
only those countries for which four continuous years of data were available for 2002-2005. (2002 is
the rst year for which CPI coverage exceeds 100 countries.)
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG): From the Political Risk Services Group, a commercial
provider of country risk assessments. The ICRG political risk rating index contains a sub-component
for corruption, which is what we use. The original ICRG corruption index is coded on a scale of 0 to
6, and is available on a monthly basis. We linearly re-scaled the scores to lie on a  2.5 to 2:5 interval
with a higher score corresponding to more corruption, and took the simple average of monthly scores
to obtain an annual score (for each country, this is computed only for those years in which all 12
months of corruption data are available). For the cross-section regressions, we use the mean ICRG
score for 2002-2005, where only countries with all four years of data are included in the sample. For
more details on the ICRG methodology, see: http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG Methodology.aspx
B. Political Stability
Average Tenure: The historically observed average tenure (in years) for political incumbents over a
20-year window. Calculated as 20=(1 + x), where x is the number of political changes observed in
the preceding 20-year window. We compute two separate average tenure measures for: (i) individual
chief executives; and (ii) the party in power (holding the seat of the chief executive).
The information on political changes was compiled from: http://www.worldstatesmen.org. We
checked the political chronologies from WorldStatesmen.org for consistency against the August 2005
version of the Database of Political Institutions (DPI). The DPI contains two variables \PRTYIN"
and \EXECME" that code respectively the number of years that the party of the chief executive has
been in power and the name of the party of the chief executive, as of 1 January of each year from
1975-2004. These variables allow us to identify years in which political changes occurred, although
they are not ideal since they do not pick up instances of extreme political volatility when more than
one change occurred in a year. Notwithstanding this, we used these DPI variables as a cross-check.
Reassuringly, few discrepancies were found, and these were resolved by consulting additional sources
on political histories, such as the Zarate Political Collections (ZPC).
Majority: From the DPI. Variable used is \MAJ", which is the fraction of seats in the legislature held
by members of the governing coalition, as of 1 January of each year.
C. Additional Variables
Real GDP per capita: From the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). Real PPP-
adjusted GDP per capita (in constant 2000 international dollars).
32Ethnic fractionalization: From Alesina et al. (2003). Equal to 1 minus the Herndahl Index of
population shares of ethnic groups within a country. (This variable does not vary over time.)
Democracy: Polity IV democracy score, on a scale of 0 to 10. The reference date for the annual
observations in the Polity IV dataset is 31 December of each year. We match these to the data
corresponding to 1 January of the following year for consistency with the DPI.
Fuel exports: From the WDI. Value of fuel exports as a percentage of total merchandize exports.
Ore exports: From the WDI. Value of ore and metal exports as a percentage of total merchandize
exports.
Imports: From the WDI. Imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP.
Presidentialism: Calculated from the DPI. The DPI variable \SYSTEM" codes political systems as: 0
for a direct presidential system; 1 for a strong president elected by a legislative assembly; and 2 for
a parliamentary system. Our presidentialism variable is equal to (2-\SYSTEM")/2, so higher values
indicate more political power concentrated with the president.
Plurality: Equal to the \PLURALTY" variable from the DPI. Variable is 1 if a rst-past-the-post rule
is used in elections to the legislature for at least some seats. Variable is coded as 0 if all seats are
determined by proportional representation (PR) rules, or if elections are not free (all legislators are
appointed or there is no competition under one-party rule).
Inverse of District Magnitude: Calculated as 1/\MDMH". The \MDMH" variable is from the DPI,
and is equal to the number of legislative seats per electoral district.
Legal Origin: From La Porta et al. (1999). Dummy variables for British, French, Scandinavian, German,
and socialist legal origin.
Region dummies: Following the World Bank's classications, dummy variables for: East Asia and the
Pacic; East Europe and Central Asia; Middle East and North America; South Asia; West Europe;
North America; Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean.
Days to start a business: Days required to start a business following all formally required procedures.
Mean taken over the years 2003-2005 (countries with less than three years of data are dropped).
From Doing Business: Benchmarking Business Regulations, a World Bank database.
Regulatory Quality: From KKM (2006). The negative of the \Regulatory Quality" index is used,
so higher scores correspond to a business environment that is less favorable towards private sector
rms. As with the \Control of Corruption" index, we drop all observations aggregated on the basis
of fewer than three source indices.
Size of Government: From the WDI. Total government consumption expenditure as a share of GDP.
Year of Independence: From the CIA World Factbook.
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40Appendix Table 1
Summary Statistics
N Min Median Max Mean Std. Dev.
A. Corruption perception indices
KKM (2002-2005) 166 -2.465 0.386 1.748 0.097 1.027
CPI (2002-2005) 102 -2.338 0.65 1.788 0.231 1.197
ICRG (2002-2005) 140 -2.5 0.616 2.5 0.422 0.949
B. Political stability measures
Avg Executive Tenure (1982-2001) 162 0.952 4.25 20 5.967 5.106
Avg Party Tenure (1982-2001) 162 1.333 5 20 7.773 6.217
Majority (1982-2001) 160 0.303 0.760 1 0.734 0.181
C. Other variables
Log real GDP per capita (1982-2001) 152 6.222 8.295 10.411 8.332 1.106
Ethnic Fractionalization 163 0 0.484 0.930 0.454 0.258
Democracy (1982-2001) 156 0 3.053 10 4.105 3.768
Imports / GDP (%, 1982-2001) 162 4.993 36.284 176.450 41.759 23.353
Fuel / Total Exports (%, 1982-2001) 154 0.001 3.709 96.538 16.068 26.009
Ore / Total Exports (%, 1982-2001) 155 0.004 2.719 75.145 8.777 14.662
Plurality (1982-2001) 149 0 1 1 0.685 0.448
Inverse District Magnitude (1982-2001) 142 0.007 0.211 1.429 0.438 0.412
Presidentialism (1982-2001) 162 0 0.85 1 0.648 0.413
Days to start a business (2003-2005) 134 2 40.5 203 50.117 37.210
Regulatory Quality (1996-2005) 134  1.854  0.096 2.386  0.091 0.948
Government Spending / GDP (%, 1982-2001) 159 4.449 16.234 43.280 16.653 6.420
Notes: In Panel A, for each corruption index, only those countries with all 4 years of data available are included when calculating the
mean corruption score from 2002-2005. Summary statistics for variables in panels B and C are for the sample of countries for which the
KKM mean (2002-2005) score was computed.
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Figure 1  
Sequence of Events 
 
 
START OF 
PERIOD  t 
Incumbent decides Et , Lt and Pt 
Firm pays Incumbent for license 
rights to Lt  
Remaining resources are 
accumulated into next period: 
Kt+1 = A ( Kt - Et - Lt )
γ 
α happens: 
Incumbent’s policy 
continued with 
probability α(Pt) 
START OF 
PERIOD  t +1 
Firm realizes pay-off from Lt 
Incumbent decides on  
Et+1, Lt+1 and Pt+1 … 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2 
The U-shape between Corruption and Average Incumbent Tenure (Cross-section) 
 
A: Log Executive Tenure 
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B: Log Party Tenure 
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Notes:  Figure A is based on regression (5) in Table 1A, while Figure B is based on regression (5) in Table 2 (KKM panel). 
The kernel regressions use a Guassian kernel function, with bandwidth = 0.25 and 300 gridpoints. Sample excludes all 
countries not independent by 1982, as well as “CHE”.Figure 3 
The U-shape between Corruption and Average Incumbent Tenure (Pooled Observations) 
 
A: Log Executive Tenure 
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B: Log Party Tenure 
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Notes: Figure A is based on the regression in Table 3, Column (3), while Figure B is based on Table 4, Column (3). 
Sample excludes countries not independent by 1976, as well as “CHE”. Residuals are obtained by regressing the 
KKM corruption measure against all right-hand side variables except the relevant log tenure measure, log tenure sq, 
(log tenure)*(Days) and (log tenure sq)*(Days). Fitted lines are plotted at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile in-
sample values of Days respectively.  